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EXPLORATION OF THE "OUTER LIMITS": THE
MISDIRECTED EVOLUTION OF RECKLESS
DISREGARD
JEROME S. KALUR*
[Als a matter of either practice or philosophy, I do not see how we
can separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations as
to what is believable.
Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting
in United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 92 (1944).
INTRODUCTION
The American common law of defamation evolved without first amend-
ment free speech or expression limitations until 1964. Before that time, the
states were free to formulate such tests for liability as they deemed appropri-
ate. Generally, liability for defamatory statements' rested upon proof that a
statement was of the kind to cause damage to reputation, was false, and had
been published to a third party.2 Once such a prma face case had been
made out, injury to reputation was presumed. 3 The United States Supreme
Court had consistently refused to enter this area of largely settled tort law.
4
The status quo was altered by the Court's landmark decision of New
York Times Co. v. Sulli'van.-' With its decision in New York Times, the Court
made defamation actions brought by public officials subject to a proof bur-
den not previously required under tort law for libel and slander. This addi-
tion was deemed necessary because of the free speech and expression
provisions of the first amendment. 6 Added to the actual falsity and proof of
publication requirements of defamatory nature was the necessity that a
plaintiff prove with convincing clarity that, at the time of publication, the
defamer either knew the statement to be false or recklessly disregarded
whether or not it was false. 7 As a consequence of the employment of the
. The author is a principal in the Cleveland law firm of Nurenberg, Plevin, Jacobson,
Heller & McCarthy. The author wishes to acknowledge the thoughts and assistance of James L.
McCrystal, Jr. in the preparation of this article.
1. As defined in RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 559 (1938), "[a] communication is defama-
tory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."
2. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 613 (1938).
3. This presumption arose when the defamatory statement was obvious or per se. When
the language required explanation to comprehend a defamatory meaning in its context, it re-
ceived the designation of per quod and damages were not presumed. See the discussion of the
common law of defamation contained in Justice White's dissenting opinion in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369-76 (1974).
4. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961); Pennekamp v. Flor-
ida, 328 U.S. 331, 348 (1946).
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. id at 279-80.
7. Id
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ephemeral term "reckless," the Supreme Court, with the appellate and trial
courts following in its wake,8 began the search for the "outer limits"9 of what
may constitute the reckless disregard1 ° element of actual malice.1 1
This article traces the judicial gloss that has been placed upon the reck-
less disregard proof standard. It is argued that the Garrison v. Louisiana falsity
definition, 12 and the subsequent St. Amani v. Thompson truth definition,
13 of
reckless disregard incorrectly directed a search for evidence of a subjective
and culpable mental state. 14 The emphasis, as shown in these two cases,
upon the requirement of proving a publisher's state of mind "in fact"' 5 has
led to a continuing judicial struggle with the legal fictions of whether one
8. The lower courts' efforts to apply the holding in New York Tines have been described as
a problem in "how to reason by analogy." See Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amend-
ment." Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 267, 278.
9. The Court first employed this term in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31
(1968). The full statement reads:
Inevitably [what constitutes reckless disregard's] outer limits will be marked out
through case-by-case adjudication, as is true with so many legal standards for judging
concrete cases, whether the standard is provided by the Constitution, statutes, or case
law.
Id.
10. 376 U.S. at 280. The New York Times decision concerned defamation allegations
against a public official. Id. at 279. The reckless disregard standard was expanded to "public
figures" in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1976); to invasion of privacy
actions in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 376 U.S. 374, 390 (1967); and to punitive damages claims in so-
called "private" plaintiff defamation cases in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350
(1974). While reckless disregard has been used in these different contexts, no definitional dis-
tinction based upon the claim for relief has occurred.
11. 376 U.S. at 280. The term "actual malice," as employed by the Court did not carry
with it the common law concept of ill will or spite. See Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357
(1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 66 (1964). The change in accepted meaning was not
an easy one for the lower courts. "Although these definitions distort common English, they
must be taken at face value." Reliance Ins. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1349 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). Justice Stewart would eventually come to "regret" the use of the term. See Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The statement of the actual malice
rule reads in full as follows:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"--that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.
376 U.S. at 279-80. Semantically, this statement implies that in the event a publisher is indiffer-
ent to determining the truth of the article or disregards that issue altogether, he would be culpa-
ble. Nevertheless, the Court's defining process as to the words "false or not," has exempted the
neutral mental state and put a "premium on ignorance" by the "irresponsible publisher." See
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 731; Redick, Freedom of the Press, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581,
600 (1964).
12. 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) ("Only those false statements made with the high degree of
awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either
civil or criminal sanctions.").
13. 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) ("There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.").
14. This mental state inquiry was foreshadowed in New York Times by reference to the
"state of mind required for actual malice." 376 U.S. at 287. This inquiry was branded in a
dissent by Justice Goldberg as an "elusive concept." Id. at 302 n.4.
15. 390 U.S. at 731. Typical of the judicial struggle over interpretation of these two words
is a statement made by Rovira, J., dissenting in Kuhn v. Tribune Republican Pub. Co., 637
P.2d 315, 324 (Colo. 1981) ("Actual malice is not a proposition that can be supported by a
normative conclusion that the publisher should have known of the falsity of the statement.
Rather, evidence of the publisher's subjective awareness is required.").
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may be subjectively "deemed" to have had, 16 or "should" have had, 17 or
"could" have had18 the required malicious state of mind.
Instead of a limited inquiry about uncertain assumptions' 9 arising out
of the countless subtleties of a defendant's mind, 20 the earlier decision of New
York Times had offered a much different formula: proving that a defendant
knew or should have known that the risk of falsity outweighed the social
utility of publication to such an unwarranted degree as to make publication,
under such a state of actual or constructive knowledge, an act of recklessness.
It is the thesis of this article that those who publish with heedless indifference
to truth or falsity should be objectively culpable under the New York Times
reckless disregard standard and that the Garrison-S. Amant subjective aware-
ness standard, which attempts to actually discern the state of mind of a de-
fendant, should be overruled.
I. DEFINING RECKLESS DISREGARD
A. The Initial Defmning Process- Trial and Error
1. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
New York Times marked the first effort by the Court to strike a balance
between the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression and the
common law's remedy for damage to reputation. 2 1 In that case, a city com-
missioner of Montgomery, Alabama brought suit against the New York Times
for publication of a paid advertisement describing the mistreatment of black
students protesting segregation in the South. The Supreme Court reversed
the verdict in favor of the plaintiff, prohibiting recovery unless there was
proof that the newspaper had defamed the commissioner by virtue of a de-
liberate falsehood, or reckless disregard as to whether the advertisement was
true or false.22 The New York Times rule prohibited recovery unless there was
proof that the defendant had defamed a person by virtue of a deliberate
falsehood, or through reckless disregard as to whether the item published
was true or false. This decision by the court represented an effort to shield
the defamatory error from culpability, even if this error was committed neg-
ligently.23 Such a shield was established in order to assure that freedom of
expression is afforded the requisite "breathing space."
'24
16. See, e.g., Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., Inc., 64 Ohio St. 2d 116, 123, n.5, 413
N.E.2d 1187, 1192, n.5 (1981). The suggested struggle is illustrated by the Ohio Supreme
Court's impliedly contra ruling just eleven months later in Bukky v. Painesville Telegraph &
Lake Geauga Printing Co., 68 Ohio St. 2d 45, 48, 428 N.E.2d 405, 407 (1981).
17. See, e.g., Brewer v. Memphis Pub. Co., Inc., 626 F.2d 1238, 1259 (1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 962 (1981).
18. See, e.g., Alioto v. Cowles Comm., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 1363, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
19. 418 U.S. 323, 353 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
20. DiLorenzo v. New York News, Inc., 78 A.D.2d 669, 671, 432 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (1980).
21. 376 U.S. at 299. "We must recognize that we are writing on a clean slate." (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
22. 376 U.S. 256.
23. Id. at 271, 278. This conditional or qualified privilege is also referred to as protecting
"honest misstatements." Id at 282, n.21. See also id at 288 ("The evidence against the Times
supports at most a finding of negligence in failing to discover the misstatements, and is constitu-
tionally insufficient to show the recklessness that is required for a finding of actual malice.").
24. Id at 272.
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While the phrase "knowledge of falsity" as stated in New York Tines
required little explanation, reckless disregard inherently bespoke a need for
judicial interpretation on a case-by-case basis. 25 This interpretive process
was initiated by the Supreme Court with a review of the New York Times trial
record and a determination of whether the defendant's pre-publication
knowledge could 26 support a jury finding of reckless disregard. The evi-
dence selected for discussion related only to what employees of the New York
Times knew before publication of the defamatory material. 2 7 This investiga-
tion disclosed that the defendant's employees believed the advertisement to
be substantially correct, 28 that no evidence had been produced to impeach
that claim, and that the defendant's belief in its correctness was based upon
a reasonable factual basis.
29
The Times references to a reasonable or good faith belief in the truth of
what was published opened the door to evidentiary considerations of what
demonstrated the reasonableness of such a conclusion. The pre-publication
conduct of the publisher may be the subject of objective evidence
30 with
respect to the defendant's reasonable 3' justification in holding a belief that
assertions were true. Consequently, Justice Brennan's majority opinion
turned to an analysis of the New York Times' conduct to determine if the
claimed pre-publication belief in the truth of the article had been proven
justifiable. 32 Looking to the content of the advertisement alone, and the
failure of the Times to investigate its claims, the Court rejected the Alabama
Supreme Court's conclusion that this conduct could be termed cavalier.
33
The Court stated that admissible evidence for a plaintiff attempting to prove
knowledge of the risk of falsity was that form of testimony or exhibit which
25. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 730. Significantly, the Court later rejected devel-
opment of factual criteria on a case-by-case basis with respect to private-person libel actions, to
which the New York Times' rule was deemed inapplicable. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. at 343 ("this approach would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations").
The same statement could also be made for reckless disregard's case-by-case development.
26. 376 U.S. at 287.
27. Id. at 286.
28. Id
29. It is important to note that the evidentiary review repeatedly characterized the basis
for the Times' belief in the accuracy of its publication as a reasonable one. For instance, the
Court stated: "that opinion was at least a reasonable one, and there was no evidence to impeach
the witness' good faith in holding it." Id at 286 (emphasis added). The Court also stated:
"First, the letter written by the Times reflected a reasonable doubt on its part as to whether the
advertisement could reasonably be taken to refer to respondent at all." Id (emphasis added).
The Court continued: "the distinction between respondent and the Governor was a reasonable
one, the good faith of which was not impeached." Id. at 287 (emphasis added). Furthermore,
"their failure to reject it on this ground was not unreasonable." Id (emphasis added).
Despite these statements, the Court, less than eight months later, in Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1964), found a trial judge in error for holding a violation of "the reasonable
belief standard" to be a basis for a finding of reckless disregard. This seemingly incredible
reversal was made without reference to the New York Times' language, quoted above, and justi-
fied by Justice Brennan's belief that use of such a test was a "suggestion" that the "immunity
from . . . responsibility . . . disappears on proof that the exercise of ordinary care would have
revealed that the statement was false." Id at 79.
30. This form of inquiry (as opposed to impeachment by direct evidence) has been used
only in New York Times, 376 U.S. at 286-89 n.28.
31. Id. But see id. at 285 n.26.
32. Id at 286.
33. Id
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demonstrated that the likelihood of falsity had been "brought home" 34
before publication. Given that it was "brought home," the evidence must
also show that the likelihood of falsity was ignored or, if not ignored, so
inadequately investigated that the claim of a belief in truth was not justified.
The nature of the publication alone was rejected as capable of raising an
inference as to the risk of falsity. 35 According to the Court, a failure to inves-
tigate entirely, or a failure to adequately investigate, would be subject to
jury evaluation for recklessness only when the risk of falsity had been
brought home to such a degree that the belief in truth was no longer
justified.
36
New York Times never reached the issue of state of mind analysis because
no evidentiary basis to bring home the risk of falsity had been proven. As
indicative of an honestly-held belief in the truth, the Court pointed to the
Times' knowledge of the good reputation of many of the sponsors of the
advertisement. 37 There was also a letter from a person known to the Times
as a responsible individual certifying that the use of the listed names was
authorized. 38 Lastly, the Tmes staff reviewed the article and found that it
did not violate its policy against publishing advertising that contained per-
sonal attacks. 39 Based upon the circumstances, the Court concluded that it
was uncontroverted that the Times had published with reasonable belief that
the article was true.
2. Garrson v. Louisiana
The Court continued the process of defining and interpreting reckless
disregard in Garrison v. Louisiana.4° In Garrison, the District Attorney for New
Orleans had conducted a press conference during which he accused eight
judges of the parish of inefficiency, laziness and of taking excessive vacations.
He was convicted of criminal defamation and appealed, attacking the consti-
tutionality of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, hold-
ing that false statements were constitutionally protected unless they were
made with a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity. 41 While the
New York Times decision had suggested that an awareness of the risk of false-
hood might be "brought home" and under certain circumstances, without
an adequate investigation, negate claims of good faith,42 it had not ad-
dressed the question of whether a specific level of awareness of the risk of
falsity must be proven43 in order to demonstrate recklessness. While Garrison
34. Id at 287. This statement sounds very similar to the "brought home" language
adopted in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 587, comment c: "It is enough that he [the
tortfeasor] knows or has reason to know of circumstances which would bring home to the reali-
zation of the ordinary reasonable man the highly dangerous character of his conduct."
35. 376 U.S. at 286.
36. Id at 287. Seealso Redick, supra note 10, at 600 n.ll.
37. 376 U.S. at 287.
38. Id
39. Id
40. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
41. Id at 66-67, 74.
42. 376 U.S. at 287.
43. See Note, In Defense of Fault in Defamation Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1735, 1735 (1979) ("When
1983]
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did provide the yardstick of probability,44 it also altered the standard for
determining who would be culpable, as compared to what had been previ-
ously implied in New York Times. 45 Instead of a reasonable basis for believ-
ing in truth, the standard as stated in Garnson was now to be determined by
the subjective mental belief of the defamer.
46
Under the holding in Garrison, one is reckless when an erroneous publi-
cation is made with a pre-existing cognizance of the probability of falsity. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court made reference to the "brought home-
state of mind" 4 7 language of New York Times, but applied it only to what the
defendant actually knew, and not as to what a reasonable person would have
believed. By restricting proof of reckless disregard to that method only, 48 the
Garrison majority ignored the defamer who is unaware of, or who does not
care, whether the story is true or false. Such a person would have no justified
basis for a subsequent claim of good faith. The New York Thnes rule had
implied that this category of defamer could also be deemed reckless.4 9
While the person who is aware of a probability of falsity may appear as
more malicious than the person who is without justification for a belief in
truth, or seeks no justification, this is not always true. One may be aware of
a probability of falsity, but decide to accept the risk of falsity because of the
societal importance of publication. 50 Under such circumstances, at least
truth or falsity has been considered and the risk evaluated. A jury might
well decide that given the circumstances, the publication, even with a
probability of falsity, was not reckless. On the other hand, those who pub-
lish with no valid basis for believing truth or who print it without regard to
considerations of truth may be even more culpable. Yet, the latter group is
freed of the possibility of a reckless designation by Garrison's probable aware-
ness formula.
The freeing of defamers who have a cavalier attitude toward the truth
was made logically mandatory by the last portion of the Garrison opinion.5
Justice Brennan appears to have confused a breach of ordinary care, negli-
gence,5 2 with the standard for measuring the breach of that duty, i.e. the
conduct of a reasonably prudent man under the same or similar circum-
the Court has formulated standards of journalistic care in the libel area, it has failed to address
the evidentiary dimension of these standards.").
44. 379 U.S. at 74. The term probability inherently signals the concept of more likely than
not or more than fifty percent. See Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 253, 272
N.E.2d 97, 100 (1971); Price v. Neyland, 320 F.2d 674, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
45. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74.
46. The Court states that culpability for reckless disregard may arise from "only those false
statements made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New
York Times . . ." Id The use of the word "only" limits proof of reckless disregard to those
situations where the defendant actually perceived, as more likely than not, that what he was
about to publish was false.
47. 376 U.S. at 280.
48. 379 U.S. at 74.
49. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
50. Ste RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500, comment a ("There may be exceptional
circumstances which make it reasonable to adopt a course of conduct which involves a high
degree of risk of serious harm to others.").
51. 379 U.S. at 78-79.
52. Id
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stances. 53 Because he believed reasonable men served as standards ony in
negligence situations, he held that standard inapplicable. 54 This eliminated
the objective, reasonable person, standard for recklessness, and with it, its
inherent risk versus social utility evaluation. 55 From that day, until the pres-
ent, the tort concept of recklessness has not existed in libel cases. All that is
left is a credibility evaluation based upon whether there was, or was not, a
subjective awareness of probable falsity. This limited standard presents a
potential plaintiff with an almost impossible proof burden.
56
3. Curtis Pubhshing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker
The Gamson modified definition of reckless disregard met its first major
test in the companion cases of Curtis Pubhshing Co. v. Butts 57 and Associated
Press v. Walker.5" Curtis Pubhshing involved an article in the Saturday Eening
Post which asserted that a college coach had conspired to "fix" a football
game. 59 The second case, Associated Press, arose from a news dispatch which
stated that a former army general had led the violent resistence to efforts by
federal marshals to enforce a desegregation order at the University of
Mississippi. 6°
The difficulty of attempting to divine a mental conclusory process was
demonstrated quickly. Justice Harlan's plurality opinion disclosed that the
Saturday Evenig Post recognized the need to confirm an improbable story.
6 1
The story informant was of dubious background, 62 the editing function was
not carried out properly, 63 inconsistencies were not checked 64 and confirma-
tion was not obtained when it easily could have been through trained sports
experts.65  Publication under such an inadequate state of knowledge was
termed by the Harlan plurality opinion as an "extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers."
66
Conversely, the record in Associated Press demonstrated "very little evi-
53. Id
54. Id at 79.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282, comment e ("'Negligence' excludes con-
duct which the actor does or should realize as involving a risk to others which is not merely in
excess of its utility, but which is out of all proportion thereto and is therefore recklessly disre-
gardful of the interests of others.").
56. Justice Douglas, dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Dunn & Bradstreet v. C.R.
Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 898 (1971), noted that, "the actual malice test has been tightened by
virtually eliminating reckless disregard as a component."
57. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
58. Id
59. Id at 135.
60. Id at 140.
61. Id. at 157. As a result, the Curis discussion of what constitutes reckless disregard picks
up where New York Tints left off.
62. Id at 157.
63. Id at 158-59, 169-70.
64. Id
65. Id
66. Id at 155. This was a lesser standard for the plaintiff than that enunciated in New York




dence relating to the preparation of the news dispatch." 6 7 The little evi-
dence available, however, reasonably justified the decision to publish.
68
Chief Justice Warren, however, believed Justice Harlan's references to
extreme departure from investigation and reporting standards to be an unu-
sual and speculative formulation.69 Although the Chief Justice made similar
references to the defendant's "slipshod and sketchy investigatory tech-
niques", 70 and the Post's "muckraking and expos6" 7 1 journalism style, he
differed from Justice Harlan in his conviction that the New York Times hold-
ing was an adequate basis for disposing of Curtis Publishing. It is in this diver-
gence of viewpoints that the fruit of Garrison's underlying reasoning may be
observed.
The source of controversy in Curtis Publishing was not how or whether to
reason by analogy72 from New York Times, but how to avoid application of
Garrison's mental state gloss. Only once in the four separate opinions which
were written for these companion cases was reference made to recovery being
permitted for reckless disregard only when there is proof of the publisher's
knowledge of probable falsity. 73 And even on that singular occasion, Justice
Harlan was distinguishing Garrison as a seditious libel action involving claims
of calculated falsehood.74 The plurality opinion then proceeded to avoid the
issue entirely by adopting a less rigorous75 standard applicable to non-gov-
ernmental defamation. 76 Chief Justice Warren also sidestepped awareness
of probable falsity, but in a different manner. Having rejected the Harlan
less rigorous standard, 77 he found New York Times to permit a determination
of reckless disregard measureable by the publisher's conduct.7 8 No mention
was made of the Garrison mental state analysis. Justice Brennan's concurring
and dissenting opinion continued on the same avoidance course.
79
It was obvious that the investigation methods of the Post were found,
both by the jury and the Court, to border on outrageous conduct. The trial
67. Id at 159.
68. Id at 158-59, 165. Justice Harlan, for the plurality, Chief Justice Warren, in his sepa-
rate opinion, and Justice Brennan, in his separate opinion, all agreed that New York Times pro-
vided adequate guidance to decide Associated Press a. Walker. The decision of the Associated
Press to publish was based upon a justified belief in the story's accuracy and therefore privileged
by the first amendment. The story itself was not "unreasonable" and the surrounding facts did
not bring home any substantial risk of falsity.
69. Id at 163.
70. Id. at 169.
71. Id
72. Professor Kalven was of the belief that nothing more was involved. See Kalven, supra
note 8, at 178.
73. 388 U.S. at 153.
74. Id
75. Id at 155.
76. Id. at 154.
77. Id at 163.
78. Id at 164. If one's conduct is the determinant of recklessness, then that conduct, to be
judged, must be compared to a standard. Even if it is said that the conduct might manifest an
awareness of falsity which may be imputed to the defendant, the question remains: to whom is
it made manifest? The standard for such a determination must be the proverbial reasonably
prudent man. Thus, while the Chief Justice's opinion was consistent with New York Times, it
was inconsistent with Gamson, which rejects the reasonable man test.
79. Id at 173-74.
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record made it equally obvious that no evidence had been presented to indi-
cate that the Post was aware of the probability of falsity. Given these two
imperatives, the subjective awareness criteria of Garrison had to be ignored or
overruled. The failure to take the latter course left the Court open to criti-
cism for inconsistency8 ° and continued to leave open the resolution of what
specific circumstances constitute actual malice.
8 1
B. The Watershed--St. Amant v. Thompson
The 1968 decision in St. Amant v. Thompsona2 was devoted to the singular
question of what may constitute reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of
assertions contained in a publication. St. Amant, a candidate for political
office, had made a televised speech in which he charged his opponent, a
labor union official, and Thompson, a deputy sheriff, with criminal con-
duct.8 3 St. Amant had obtained an affidavit from an informant who was
known to him to be in a knowledgeable position within a labor union.84 The
affidavit included defamatory charges which were determined at trial to be
false as to Thompson.8 5 St. Amant did not investigate the accuracy of his
informant's charges before publishing the contents of the affidavit,86 and he
justified his failure to investigate by maintaining that there was no cause to
suspect that the charges were false. 87
In rejecting a claim of a duty to investigate merely because a story is
defamatory,88 the Court's opinion acknowledged the possibility of encourag-
ing irresponsibility and putting a "premium on ignorance. ' ' 89 The Court
justified this position by once again stating that the test was not what a
reasonably prudent man would do in the exercise of ordinary care. 9° The
Court focused instead upon the concept of mental awareness. The qualified
privilege which a publisher enjoys may be lost when the publisher is know-
thgly indifferent to his own doubts. According to the Court in St. Amant,
"There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defend-
ant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." 9' t
80. Justice Black's dissent makes the point forcefully:
If this precedent is followed, it means that we must in all libel cases hereafter weigh
the facts and hold that all papers and magazines guilty of gross writing or reporting
are constitutionally liable, while they are not if the quality of the reporting is ap-
proved by a majority of us.
Id at 171.
81. Note, Times Marches On. The Courts' Continuing Expanson ofhe Applcation ofthe "Actual
Malice" Standard, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 153, 160 (1971).
82. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
83. Id at 728.
84. Id at 733.
85. Id at 730.
86. Id at 733.
87. Id Justice White's majority opinion justifies a conclusion of no awareness of probable
falsity by reference to facts which would justify a reasonably prudent man in believing his
publication to be true, e.g. St. Amant had met his source nine months before in connection with
union activities; the information supplied was under oath; and the informant agreed to stand
behind his story at personal risk to himself. Id
88. The Court rejected inferences of recklessness as "colorless." Id at 733.
89. Id. at 731.
90. Id at 731-32.
91. Id at 731.
1983]
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Despite the importance such a subjective test places upon a defendant's
own testimony that he had no serious doubts, the St. Amant opinion offered
circumstantial proof alternatives.9 2 Specific examples were afforded as to
what acts or omissions would support a finding that the defendant did, in
fact, publish in bad faith. 93 Defendant's claims of good faith (no serious
doubts as to truth) would not likely prove to be persuasive9 4 where the evi-
dence disclosed: 1) a story fabricated or imagined; 2) a story based wholly
on anonymous and unverified sources; 3) obvious reasons to doubt the truth-
fulness of an informant or his accuracy; or 4) a story, "so inherently improb-
able that only a reckless man would put [it] in circulation. '9 5 These
examples were offered to prove objective evidence of a subjectively malicious
state of mind.9 6 Stated differently, pre-publication conduct could be cir-
cumstantial evidence through which to judge the credibility of the defend-
ant's claim that he had not abused his qualified privilege.
While the St. Amant decision was intended to afford "meaningful gui-
dance" in defining reckless disregard, its logical inconsistencies, born of Garri-
son, made that result impossible. First among the contradictions is the
unexplained adoption of the serious doubt test. Since the word "probable"
is omitted from the serious doubt formulation, it might be concluded that
doubts as to verity which did not reach fifty percent 97 were being included
as indicative of recklessness. Yet, this conclusion proves unwarranted be-
cause the Court concluded that the evidence offered did not prove that St.
Amant was aware of probable falsity.98 Thus, although the words used in
the doubt test appear less exacting, their meaning is the same: either doubts
as to truth or awareness of falsity must subjectively rise to the level of a
"probability" before liability is possible.
While Justice White speaks of "reckless conduct" in St. Amant, 99 the
harbinger of liability is a mental conclusion as to truth or falsity. At the
same time, prepublication conduct is probative in order to determine if the
testimony as to mental conclusion is true. The finder of fact does not decide
if conduct is indicative of an abuse of the first amendment's qualified privi-
lege; instead, he decides if the conclusion made after the acts or omissions
occurred is truthfully reported. The decision affords no explanation regard-
ing why there was no decision that the publication conduct was or was not
reckless.
Under the reasoning of St. Amant, the trier of fact may hear evidence of
examples of inappropriate conduct, but those examples may not be used to
92. Id at 732. ("The defendant ... cannot, however, automatically insure a favorable
verdict by testifying that he published with a belief that the statements were true. The finder of
fact must determine whether the publication was indeed made in good faith.").
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id The "inherently improbable" criterion has been referred to as a catch-all category.
See, Note, A Clariftation ofthe Actual Malice Test, 47 N.C. L. REV. 471, 475 (1969).
96. See Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 238 (1976).
97. See supra note 42.
98. 390 U.S. at 732.
99. Id. at 731.
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determine that the defamer should have had serious doubts. Such a conclu-
sion would require a standard of comparison to the reasonably prudent
man.1° ° The evidentiary inferences that arise must only be used to test the
defendant's credibility.' 0 ' Despite its ban on judgments based on reasona-
bleness, the St. Amant opinion lists the reasons why St. Amant's publication
was made with a reasonably justified belief in its accuracy, thereby negating
any need for further investigation.
10 2
The post-St. Amant evolution of reckless disregard was not indicative of
an area of settled principles. Determining the credibility of a claimed
mental state proved to be an elusive proposition,103 which was further com-
pounded when the standard was not restricted to defamation occurring in
the public or governmental area.l°4 In addition, the concept of judgment
based upon an objective standard of care had to be rejected again and
again. 105
The mental element proved particularly difficult when the issue became
the reporting of what someone else said, rather than what he did. 10 6 If lan-
guage was left out or added to, did this reveal, in itself, serious doubt as to
the truth of the published story? The Court's answer was a qualified no. If
the defendant honestly believed that his editing caused the true meaning of
the speaker's remarks to be revealed, serious doubts, and therefore reckless
disregard, did not exist. 107 If the editing was done with the intent to distort
and falsify, the reporter's claim of good faith could not stand.'10  The Court
did acknowledge, however, that the esoteric nuances of these mental deci-
sions were not always easy to ascertain.109
It is reasonable to suspect that the near or actual impossibility of divin-
ing the motivation behind such esoteric conclusions contributed to a refusal
of a majority of the Court to extend the New York Times rule to all defama-
tion actions involving public issues. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc. ," 1o came closest to acknowledging this difficulty when he
charged the Brennan plurality opinion with having an "inadequate appreci-
ation of the limitations imposed by the legal process in accomodating the
tension between state libel laws and the federal constitutional protection
given to freedom of speech and press.""'
100. Again, the Court was under the belief that the reasonable man only determines what is
ordinary care under the circumstances. See supra note 29.
101. 390 U.S. at 732.
102. Id at 733.
103. See Greenbelt Coop. Publication Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10 n.3 (1970).
104. The Curtis Publishing plurality distinction for non-governmental defamation did not
survive as a distinct entity but was merged into the mutated New York Times standard. See
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971).
105. Id at 276.
106. See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
107. Id at 289.
108. Id at 292. While thterpretation was proper, deliberate distortion with false intent was
improper. The rationale is that one can be aware of the probability of falsity in the latter
instance.
109. Monitor Patriot, Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. at 276.




In Herbert v. Lando,'1 2 the Court was confronted with one of the neces-
sary consequences of having directed the ultimate issue of reckless disregard
to the mental attitude of the defamer: discovery of the defendant's thoughts
and reasoning process would be a prime concern of plaintiffs seeking to
prove awareness of probable falsity by direct evidence. During the course of
sanctioning such inquiries,' 1 3 the Court had occasion to review the require-
ment that a finding of reckless disregard for truth or falsity hinges upon a
determination as to the defendant's state of mind.' 
1 4
Justice White's majority opinion in Herbert summarized the New York
Times rule as an attempt to discourage "erroneous information known to be
false or probably false." 115 No reason is given as to why the subjective deci-
sional level is placed at a probability. 1 6 Also ignored by the "reason to
suspect" alteration is its objective implications. Deciding whether someone
was consciously aware of a probability implies a much more focused inquiry
on what the defamer was thinking than does the new wording "reason to
suspect." Determining what a defamer had reason to suspect rests much
more heavily on what information was available and what a person of nor-
mal intelligence and experience would suspect based on that information.
C. The Limited Alternative- Outrageous Publications
While the Curtis Publishing plurality standard of care did not survive,'
17
its finding of liability as a reaction to slipshod journalism did. Typical of
such cases is Goldwater v. Ginzburg. " 83 The defendants maintained their good
faith in publishing a "psychological" analysis of presidential candidate
Barry Goldwater. 19 Although there was evidence that the publishers may
have known their publication contained fabrications, 20 the appellate opin-
ion focused upon investigative omissions and what they signified.'
2'
Charges of mental illness were deemed "inherently improbable" based upon
the investigative material available.' 22 Consequently, a thorough investiga-
112. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
113. The Court stated:
It is also untenable to conclude from our cases that, although proof of the necessary
state of mind could be in the form of objective circumstances from which the ultimate
fact could be inferred, plaintiffs may not inquire directly from the defendants whether
they knew or had reason to know or suspect that their damaging publication was in
error.
Id at 160.
114. Id at 158-62.
115. Id at 172.
116. Justice White's statement of "probably false" appears inconsistent with his earlier ref-
erence to culpability when the defamer "had reason.., to suspect. . . error." Id at 160. The
only way to rationalize this inconsistency is to assume that the doubt which gives rise to the
suspicion must be one that rises to at least the level of more likely than not. Justice White later
refers to the degree of awareness as "strongly suspected." Id at 172.
117. Monitor Patriot, Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. at 271.
118. 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969).
119. Id at 331.
120. Id at 332.
121. Id at 329, 334.
122. Id at 337 (publication upon the facts known and knowable by a "reasonable" investi-
gation were deemed to create an inference of a preconceived plan to publish without regard to
truth or falsity).
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tion to serve as a reasonable check upon the truth was required.1 23
Following the description of the defendant's careless investigation, the
Second Circuit opinion recognized that the separate items of carelessness,
while alone indicative only of negligence, cumulatively presented an issue of
recklessness.124 The message was that selective reporting (whatever the sub-
jective and honestly-held belief of the defendant) designed to lend credence
to a predetermined result is determinable objectively as reckless disregard. 125
On this basis, and without regard to proof of actual awareness of probable
falsity, the judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.'
26
II. THE PROBLEM CREATED BY THE DEFINITION
A. Identication of the Problem
The continuing need for factual reviews of libel judgments was a symp-
tom that easily applied principles had not evolved out of New York Times and
its progeny. In the first seven years after the decision, the Court attempted
to strike an appropriate balance on a case by case basis' 27 no less than six-
teen times. The subsequent decline in review of cases involving claims of
reckless disregard appears to be due more to the denials of certiorari 28 than
to any decline in the volume of cases. As will be discussed, these cases ex-
hibit Justice Stewart's unstated misapprehensions 29 as to what constitutes
valid evidence of reckless disregard.
Perhaps no single case better exemplifies the difficulty of attempting to
apply the Garrison-St. Amant awareness-in-fact concept as does Alioto v. Cowles
Communications, Inc. 130 Spanning almost eleven years, four trials, two appel-
late decisions, and two denials of certiorari, it is a prime example of the
problem of attempting to prove a subjective mental state through objective
123. Id at 339.
124. The full statement reads:
Times does not hold that evidence of negligence is inadmissible; it only holds that
evidence which merely establishes negligence in failing to discover misstatements,
without more, is constitutionally insufficient to support the finding of recklessness re-
quired to establish actual malice from proof of less than prudent conduct. Reckless-
ness is, after all, only negligence raised to a higher power. To hold otherwise would
require that plaintiff prove the ultimate fact of recklessness without being able to ad-
duce proof of the underlying facts from which a jury could infer recklessness. It would
limit successful suits to those cases in which there is direct proof by a party's admission
of ultimate fact, certainly a situation not intended by the Supreme Court.
Id at 343.
125. See also Airlie Foundation, Inc. v. Evening Star, 337 F. Supp. 421, 424 n.9 (D.D.C.
1972).
126. 414 F.2d at 339. The charge to the jury predicated a finding of reckless disregard upon
proof of heedless indifference to truth or falsity. Goldwater has been referred to as modifying the
Times test to include recovery based not upon state of mind, but upon the "outrageousness" of
the defendant's conduct. See Note, T; New York Times Rule.- An Analysis ofIts Appliation, 55
MNN. L. REv. 299, 317 (1970). Rather than a modification, Goldwater may have been a return
to the tort concept inherent in recklessness and recognized in New York Times. See supra note 29.
127. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 903 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting
from a denial of certiorari).
128. During the 1980-1981 term, the Court declined to accept review of any of the twenty
libel cases for which petitions for certiorari were filed. 7 Med. L. Rptr., Decisions (BNA) (1981).
129. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. at 199.
130. 430 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afd 623 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1980).
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evidence. The lawsuit was the result of a Look Magazi'ne article which as-
serted that San Francisco's mayor, Joseph Alioto, had extensive financial
dealings with organized crime figures.' 3 ' The hearsay report of such deal-
ings was rendered by a source of questionable background' 32 and based
upon the purported statements of a person who was never interviewed. At-
tempts to confirm Alioto's presence at a critical meeting were fruitless, al-
though at least one of the alleged participants was interviewed but not asked
about the meeting.' 33 Alioto admitted knowing several of the alleged partici-
pants but was never asked if a meeting occurred.' 34 The defendants main-
tained throughout that they honestly believed their informant's story and
had no serious doubt as to its truth at the time of publication.
135
The first Ahoto trial ended in a hung jury. The second trial also resulted
in a hung jury, although the jury did agree that the reported meeting to
arrange underworld financing was defamatory and false. 136 After the sec-
ond trial, the trial judge acknowledged that the jury indecision was caused
by an inability to agree upon whether reckless disregard of the truth had
been proven.13 7 The trial court's subsequent granting of judgment notwith-
standing the verdict for the defendant was reversed by the Ninth Circuit
after an extensive factual review and a finding that the evidence could per-
mit a finding of reckless disregard.' 38 After yet a third trial and another
hung jury, both sides waived a fourth jury. 139 Finally, after four trials, judg-
ment was rendered for the plaintiff,140 the judgment was affirmed by the
Tenth Circuit and, certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court.
It is most probable that the second and third juries could not agree
upon whether the defendants had serious doubts in fact. The evidence did
offer sufficient support of the defendant's claims of an honestly-held belief in
the truth of what was printed so as to rule out fabrication.' 4 ' It is not diffi-
cult to conceive of the jurors being convinced that any reasonable man
would have had serious doubts, but not being able to conclude that these
particular defendants had serious doubts. Under these conflicting infer-
131. 623 F.2d at 617.
132. The reports of improper activities were repeated statements of another individual.
Judge Schwarzer noted that almost nothing was known about the background of the informant,
while the person whose alleged statements were repeated, was known as a "notorious hoodlum"
and "liar." 430 F. Supp. at 1370.
133. Id at 1371.
134. Id
135. Id. at 1370. The defendants obtained information from law enforcement authorities
that a series of loans had been made by a bank where the plaintiff served as chairman of the
board. Id at 1366. These loans had been made to the underworld figure whose statements
about the meetings were subsequently repeated. Id at 1366-67. This fact and others obtained
by the reporters gave at least a strong circumstantial rationale for their belief that they were
reporting what had in fact occurred. The trial court found, however, that "[a] leap from this
information to the charge of a nighttime cabal with major hoodlums to provide the financial
where-withal for underworld business activities is too great to be performed without obvious
reasons for doubt." Id at 1370-71.
136. The case history is set out in 623 F.2d at 617-18.
137. 519 F.2d at 779-80.
138. Id. at 781.
139. 430 F. Supp. at 1365.
140. General damages were awarded in the amount of $350,000. Id. at 1372.
141. Id at 1365.
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ences, and the natural desire not to exculpate those who cause damage to
reputation, a hung jury was not a surprising result.
The opinion written after the fourth trial, while couched in the lan-
guage of determining a subjective state of mind, 142 phrases the ultimate
finding of reckless disregard in objective terms: "[the author's] belief could
not have been held in good faith."' 14 3 This conclusion illustrates the consis-
tent difficulty that has pervaded the efforts of the lower courts to deal with
the subjective state of mind concept. This finding in Alioto is based upon
what could or should have been concluded, and not upon what was believed.
For purposes of analysis, the cases most illustrative of this contradiction and
misapplication are best reviewed under the St. Amant objective evidentiary
examples.
1. Fabrication or Fictionalization
Proof that a defendant made up a defamatory and false statement does
not, in and of itself, demonstrate reckless disregard. 144 It must also be
demonstrated that the fabricated statement had no reasonably supportive
4 5
factual background. A defendant may not be liable if he can demonstrate
that, although he did not have information that a particular event occurred,
he did not have serious doubts that it did occur, based on his state of knowl-
edge as to other events and causes of conduct preceeding his speculative
account. 146
An example of these arguments in conflict is afforded by Varnish v. Best
Medium Publishing Co. 147 The defendant had written a story giving reasons
for the suicide of the plaintiff's wife. His conclusions regarding her mental
outlook were not supported by any factual evidence.' 48 On the other hand,
the information obtained from the defendant's investigation could have been
interpreted (without intent of falsity) to suggest a view not consistent with an
awareness of falsity.149 Apparently ignoring these issues, the Second Circuit
found the defendant's fabrication sufficient to justify a jury finding of reck-
lessness because the author's "presumption" had no basis in fact.
150
142. Id at 1371.
143. Id The essence of such a finding is that given the existing state of knowledge, no rea-
sonable person would not have had serious doubts as to the truth. The first court of appeals
opinion used much the same language: "the authors must have had doubts about the veracity
of [the informant]." 519 F.2d at 780.
144. Beckley Newspaper Inc. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967).
145. Guam Fed. of Teachers Local 1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438, 439 (9th Cir. 1974).
146. See Oliver v. Village Voice, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). ("To establish
recklessness, it is not sufficient to show that the reporting in question was speculative or even
sloppy."). Bui see Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1976) (fabricating facts
upon speculation requires a finding of serious doubt).
147. 405 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1968).
148. Id at 612.
149. See Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82 (1967) and Time, Inc. v. Pape,
401 U.S. 279, 283 (1971).
150. The decisive factor in the court's decision is an indifference to truth resulting in a
finding of recklessness. The state of mind of the defendant played little or no part in that
determination. 405 F.2d at 612-13. For a similar reasoning process, see Montandon v. Triangle
Publications, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 949, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, 193 (1975).
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2. Obvious Reasons to Doubt the Informant or the Inherently
Improbable Tale
The threshold question when referring to "obvious reasons to doubt or
inherent improbability" is: obvious or improbable to whom? Under the Gar-
rzson-St. Amant definition, one would expect the only inquiry to be whether
the defendant found the informant or the story to be of doubtful validity.
Whether the story should have been improbable to him would seem to be
irrelevent. 15 ' But is it really possible to separate considerations of what is
believed from what is believable? Is the scienter requirement applied when
the plaintiff demonstrates by circumstantial evidence that the informant or
his story yielded objective reasons to suspect untruth? The answer to these
questions is often inseparable from the question of the appropriateness of the
investigation conducted in the face of doubtful informants or stories. Ac-
cordingly, both topics must receive attention when examining the represen-
tative decisions.
In Airie Foundation, Inc. v. Evenng Star Newspaper Co. ,152 the defendant
ran a story involving charges of CIA involvement in the plaintiff's activi-
ties.' 53 After the initial publication of the charges, the defendant received
CIA denials which left it questioning the truthfulness of its printed story.
154
Nevertheless, follow-up stories failed to state specifically that the CIA had
denied the truthfulness of the story. 15 5 The defendant's attempt to justify its
equivocal statements as "reasonable" was summarily rejected by the court:
"Viewed objectively this treatment portrayed the existing situation in an ex-
tremely misleading fashion."
156
The basis for the Air/'e court's finding of reckless disregard is the evi-
dence of "selective reporting"1
57 designed to reach a preconceived result.1
58
This conclusion suggests that an investigation must have as its goal the reso-
lution of the doubts that prompted it, and not simply gaining support for the
improbable or questionable story. If the story, and not truth, is the goal, the
defendant may be found to be reckless. When passing upon the selective
reporting claims, the jury was instructed in Airlie that it could decide when
and, by implication, what amount of investigation was justified under the
151. Although this conclusion flows logically from the "in fact" language of St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968), that same opinion refers to a "reckless man" as putting
inherently improbable stories into circulation. Id at 732. The use of the unreasonably impru-
dent man as an objective standard is thereby sanctioned in direct contradiction to the earlier
"in fact" subjective standard.
152. 337 F. Supp. 421 (D.D.C. 1972).
153. The essence of the claims made was that plaintiff's activities were financed by the
Central Intelligence Agency and consequently the goals served were not those claimed by plain-
tiffs but those of the CIA. Id at 423.
154. Id at 425 n.10.
155. Id at 426.
156. Id
157. Id at 429.
158. Id In order to bolster its informant's story, the defendant "omitted matters known to it
which would have detracted from the charge or at least presented it in a more balanced fashion,
that it added details, some of which it knew to be false, which tended to lend credence to the
charge ....
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circumstances.' 5 9 In essence, the jury was allowed to pass objective judg-
ment upon what should have been done to investigate the story where there
were obvious reasons to doubt accuracy. If the investigation fell short of
what was reasonable, the defendant was reckless.
Caught in a quandry, some courts have tried to decide both objectively
and subjectively. In Brewer v. Memphis Publshing Co. ,160 after three jury trials
all resulting in verdicts for the plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding
the evidence incapable of establishing reckless disregard of truth or falsity. 1
6 1
The information giving rise to the allegedly libelous story was received from
an informant who had heard the story from another.162 The subsequent
headlines and the published story were admitted surmises based upon inves-
tigation of the plaintiff's history and the hearsay information. ' 63 The inves-
tigation supplied no direct factual confirmation for the defamatory items in
the story.164 The Brewer factual analysis devoted itself to evaluating the rea-
sonableness of the reporter's investigatory conclusions. Having done so, the
appellate court decided that the defendants neither "entertained serious
doubt, [nor] reasonably should have, about the story's accuracy."
' 6 5
These illustrative cases demonstrate the difficulty in logical and eviden-
tiary application of the subjective state of mind requirement of Garrison-St.
Amant. The cases also exhibit an inconsistency of result and a lack of pre-
dictability.' 66 Such results are indicative of judgmental standards which do
159. 337 F. Supp. at 429.
160. 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980).
161. Id at 1259.
162. Nothing was known about the underlying informant's reputation, although the Fifth
Circuit appears to determine that there is a presumption of truthfulness when the underlying
informant is a "friend" of the direct informant and no affirmative reason for disbelief exists. Id
at 1258. The underlying informant was apparently never interviewed. Id
163. Id at 1258-59.
164. Id
165. Id at 1259. The reference to the objective "or should have" is not explained explicitly.
Some insight into the reasoning process is found in the dismissal of the claim that reliance upon
an unknown source of information was reckless. This conclusion is justified by a comparative
reference (Id at 1259): "We certainly ought not to require of the press the degree of reliability
that we must require of the police when several informer links provide them with information
on which they seek a search warrant." A lesser standard of certainty as to truth, below
probability, is thereby suggested.
166. Outcome determination appears to be decided by the emphasis that a court places on
the "in fact" requirement as opposed to ignoring it in the face of sloppy reporting which may be
demonstrated objectively. Examples of cases adhering to the subjective requirement are: Van-
denburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1975) (defendant's choice of whom to
believe from sources he believed reliable, despite conflicting information from other sources, did
not create jury issue over high degree of awareness); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., Inc., 429
F. Supp. 167, 179 (D.D.C. 1977) (defendant's "attitude" of belief in truth of one source fur-
nished adequate basis for no question of serious doubt); Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565,
572-73 (5th Cir. 1969) (the jury may not infer inherent improbability where the defendant was
not aware of "contra-indication" as to conclusions which were published); Stone v. Essex
County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161, 173 (1975) (although the information
available would have seemed inherently improbable if viewed objectively, there can be no lia-
bility because the defendant did not so view the information); and Buckley v. Painesville Tele-
graph & Lake Geauga Printing Co., 68 Ohio St. 2d 45, 50, 428 N.E.2d 405 (1981) (defendant's
claims of good faith warranted summary judgment despite 169 deposition answers indicating
lack of knowledge as to reliability of sources, manner of investigation, and verification).
Cases substantially ignoring the subjective awareness formula are: Church of Scientology
of Cal. v. Dell Publishing Co., 362 F. Supp. 767, 770 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (once sources are ques-
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not pass the crucible test of practical evidentiary situations.
III. ADOPTING AN OBJECTIVE TEST FOR RECKLESS DISREGARD
A. The Unreasonably Imprudent Man.: An Appropriate Standard for Judging
Reckless Disregard
The United States Supreme Court consistently has refused to permit a
judgment of libel regarding a publication decision based upon what a rea-
sonably prudent person would have done under the same or similar circum-
stances. 16 7 A defamer's attitude toward truth or falsity may not be decided
by what the jury believes was a proper, reasonable response to the informa-
tion available. Instead, the decision is an affirmative or negative response to
the defamer's testimony that he had no serious doubts as to the truth or that
he had no reason to suspect probable falsity. Since the New York Times stan-
dard is founded upon an attitude of recklessness toward truth or falsity, as
opposed to the lower fault concept of negligence, 168 the Goldwater court has
deemed these references to what a reasonably prudent publisher would, or
should, have done if acting under the proper attitude, to be inappropri-
ate.169 This prohibition appears to be ill-founded.
Negligence and recklessness are nothing more than successive degrees of
cognitive fault. Negligence is conduct which falls below the ordinary care
that should be exercised by a reasonably prudent man under the same or
similar circumstances. Because it falls below the level of ordinary care, it
creates a risk of harm to others that is considered to be unreasonable and
thus culpable. Recklessness includes negligence but represents a higher de-
gree of actual or imputed acceptance of unreasonable risk.170 As the risk of
harm rises, the social utility of the conduct decreases. 1' Because this in-
creasing disproportion is, or should become known, and because acts in spite
of it are the assumption of an unreasonable risk, the decision to take the risk
is termed "indifference." 172 The vantage point for assessing reckless disre-
gard of the risk disproportion therefore must be objective. In the event that
tioned, good faith to be measured by the reasonableness of investigation conducted); Akins v.
Altus Newspapers, Inc., 609 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Okla. 1977) (defendant's conduct is determinative
of whether heedless indifference to truth or falsity existed); Durso v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 33 IlI.
App. 3d 300, 337 N.E.2d 443, 447 (1975) (those who publish an expos6 book must thoroughly
investigate allegations before publication); and DeLorenzo v. New York News, Inc., 78 A.D.2d
669, 671, 432 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (1980) (the conduct and underlying circumstances revealed by
investigation may negate good faith claims).
167. 379 U.S. at 79.
168. Id.
169. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 500, comment a (1965) ("To be reckless it must be unreasonable; but to be reckless,
it must be something more than negligent. It must not only be unreasonable, but it must in-
volve a risk of harm to others substantially in excess of that necessary to make the conduct
negligent.").
170. Seesupra note 165.
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500, comment a (1965). ("So too, there may be
occasions in which action which would ordinarily involve so high a degree of danger as to be
reckless may be better than no action at all, and therefore both reasonable and permissible.").
172. The term was used in RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 1068 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1936).
The language of this section may have been consulted for the New York Tmes' actual malice
rule. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 167 n.1
7
(1979). Section 1068 stated that one is liable
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the focus of inquiry is permitted to be upon the defendant's appreciation of
the risk disproportion only, society loses its ability to place a value judgment
upon the conduct of one of its members. Subjective risk appreciation in-
quiry results in culpability only when the jury decides against the credibility
of a defendant. Under such limits, no value judgment is made upon the
state of knowledge of a defamer and his conduct based upon that knowledge.
In the process, the basic fault concept of recklessness is lost.
The reckless disregard portion of the rule' 73 was the result of a hybrid
formed from the common law's qualified privilege regarding comments con-
cerning public officials and the constitutional requirements of free expres-
sion. 1 74 The "like rule," 1 75 from which the qualified privilege was drawn,
was set forth in the Kansas Supreme Court decision in Coleman v. MacLen-
nan. 176 That decision placed upon a defamation defendant the burden of
proving his right to a qualified privilege.' 77 The burden would be carried
only when it was demonstrated that: 1) the publication was made to serve a
public concern or need; 178 and 2) that the defendant had formed an honest
belief (based upon all reasonable effort) as to the truth of what was pub-
lished.' 79 As a result of this proof burden, the objective review function of
the jury, under claims of the public official privilege, had become so ac-
cepted that the Restatement of Torts i80 declared that one who claimed the
qualified privilege, without "reasonable grounds for so believing," was not
entitled to its protection even if he honestly and in fact believed the publica-
tion to be true. There was no premium on unsupported defamatory
statements.
New York Times did not change substantially the public official qualified
privilege. Because of first amendment imperatives, the defendant could
have apresumption of a reasonable and good-faith-truth basis for publication,
simply by claiming it.' 8 ' Liability for abuse of the qualified privilege exists
only through proof of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for whether
the story was false or not. 182 Relevant evidence to prove such abuse had to
for punitive damages for libel when: "the defamatory matter was published with knowledge of
its falsity or if it was published in reckless indifference to its truth or falsity."
173. The adoption of the proof standard also encompassed a change in the burden of proof.
See tina note 177.
174. New York Ti~nes, 376 U.S. at 271. "Authoritative interpretations of the First Amend-
ment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth . . .
especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker."
175. Id at 280.
176. 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
177. The Kansas Supreme Court approved a jury charge explaining the defendant's burden
when asserting an "honest belief in the truth": "If you believe then from the evidence.., that
the defendant made all reasonable effort to ascertain the facts before publishing the same, and
that the whole thing was done in good faith. . . your verdict must be for the defendant.
98 P. at 282.
178. Id at 293.
179. Id at 282.
180. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 601 (1938). This rule still applies to private libel actions,
at least for compensatory damage. See, e.g., O'Berman v. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d
1381, 1385 (7th Cir. 1972), and Brown v. Skaggs-Albertson's Properties, Inc., 563 F.2d 983,
986-87 (10th Cir. 1977).
181. 376 U.S. at 279.
182. Id
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be directed to a showing of an unreasonable or imprudent assumption of
truth based upon the known and properly knowable facts.'
8 3
This objective formula of abuse determination was not meant to be
modified by the Court's reference to the defendant's "state of mind."'184 In
the context of its use, the term applied to the mere existence of information
contra to what was published as not determining an unreasonable belief in
the truth of what was published.' 85 It should be the jury that determines
what extent of belief confirmation was required. The subsequent Garrison
determination that "state of mind" meant conscious awareness of probable
falsity substantially alters Nw York Times by permitting a defamer to have
no concern for truth or to avoid evaluation of the truth conclusion if made.
If he publishes without thought to truthfulness, he does not have a state of
mind toward truth and, indeed, is not required to have one. It is only if the
defamer actually thinks about truth and finds the statement to be probably
false that a jury is permitted to reach a verdict.
The conjunction of the presumption of a reasonable basis for believing
the publication to be accurate, and the necessity that recklessness be proven
only by evidence of the defendant's negative conclusion as to truth seemingly
provided for exclusion of the reasonably prudent man standard. Neverthe-
less, it is questionable if this really occurs when the attempts to define state of
mind are made, as they almost always are,' 86 by circumstantial evidence.
When these avenues of proving reckless disregard are examined, they reveal
a contradictory result: they permit a finding of bad faith only by an im-
puted finding of unreasonable conduct. For example, if the plaintiff's evi-
dence reveals that the primary source for a story had prior convictions for
perjury and his story was deemed by knowledgeable sources to be questiona-
ble, what has been proven regarding the defamer's state of mind with regard
to such a knowledge status? Two inferences have been created: 1) that no
reasonably prudent person would have published without having serious
doubts as to the story's truthfulness; and/or 2) that the defendant must have
had serious doubts as to the truth. The conclusions embodied in both infer-
ences are irrelevant if the only evidentiary goal is to demonstrate a subjective
state of mind. Obviously, these circumstantially founded conclusions about
what should have been believed do not tell us if the defamer actually
thought a statement to be free of serious doubts as to its truthfulness. Yet,
that is what is required of the fact finder in passing upon the "in fact" credi-
bility issue.
It simply does not follow that the mental decision process, gathering
together impressions, historical analysis, and experience factors can be ex-
posed or defined by circumstantial evidence. This is because the aim of such
evidence is not to demonstrate a mental state, but to prove a state of knowl-
edge that was available to the defendant for him to accept, reject, miscon-
183. The New York Times plaintiffs were not given a second trial because the evidence could
not justify an interference of unreasonable imprudence. Id at 286-88.
184. Id at 287.
185. Id.
186. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 729.
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strue, ignore, or develop further by investigation. Consequently, a subjective
state of mind, except when directly provable by admissions against interest,
is a wholly inappropriate standard to the objective tort of recklessness.1
8 7
The reasons that determine when one believes facts to be true and free
from serious doubt are many and complex. They depend not only upon the
information available, but upon impressions obtained when that informa-
tion was received and upon prior life experience as it is used to evaluate
information. By requiring a jury to determine the credibility of a defend-
ant's claim that he did not have serious doubt as to the truth, we counte-
nance a result which may be contrary to fact. Despite a completely adverse
state of knowledge, the defamer, on objectively unreasonable grounds, may
have honestly believed' 8 8 he had no serious doubts as to truth. It is not
surprising that a jury would reach a verdict that is at variance with such
honestly-held beliefs based upon what it will accept as believable and as
manifesting heedless indifference to the consequences of publication.' 8 9
When this occurs, the verdicts are not based upon credibility; instead, they
are based upon a value judgment as to what a reasonably prudent man
should, or should not, have published, based on the information available.
Faced with an impending jury charge that before reckless disregard
may be found, the jury must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
defendant infact had serious doubts as to the truth, counsel for the plaintiff
must make a logically impossible closing argument. He must argue that the
investigatory facts, when objectively analyzed, yield the inference that the
reporter knew he was publishing a falsehood and that his denials at trial are
mere falsehoods to avoid culpability. Logically, however, the inferences
from the objective evidence the plaintiff has offered prove nothing as to the
defendant's pre-publication mental state. They prove only what should
have been known to a prudent reporter. Consequently, the defense's closing
argument will make the point that the failure to check further or await sup-
porting documents, while in retrospect perhaps not diligent, does not in any
way prove that his client did not believe his sources and his story. The de-
fendant may further argue that demonstrating that a story does not sound
believable to a fair-minded person or that a source should not be believed by
the jury in retrospect, does not demonstrate that the defendant was reckless
in believing it. Counsel for defendant would finish by pointing out that his
client is not to be judged by what he should have believed but by what he
did believe, regardless of whether a juror would have believed the story true.
Thus, a struggle over what was the reporter's state of mind is not consistent
with the tortious concept of recklessness. This is true because the concept of
recklessness is not reconcilable with a subjective determination. To ignore
this problem and confine the inquiry to "in fact" proof of knowledge, is to
involve the parties in an evidential quandry. Juries should not be forced to
continue to struggle with these logical contradictions. 190
187. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
188. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 286-87.
189. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
190. Id. at 108. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79 (1964); St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
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B. What Must Be Done to Correct the Problem-Conclusion
The subjective test has misdirected the evolution of the case-by-case de-
fining process through insistence upon defining the defendant's state of
mind. Despite this restrictive standard, plaintiffs occasionally prevail, if only
in the most flagrant' 9 1 instances of libelous endeavor. Those flagrant cases
reveal a judicial effort to obviate the need for adherence to the state of mind
test by substituting accepted objective tests for recklessness.' 9 2 The common
thread of these decisions is to allow culpability for those who publish with
reason to know the unreasonable risk of falsity that is being incurred.
In the forefront of these cases is Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc. 193
The requirement of "in fact" recognition of serious doubt was rejected by
the Colorado Supreme Court: t 94 "whether or not a statement is true does
not mean that there must be a finding that the person making the statement
had serious doubts as to the truth thereof." In place of the subjective
probability requirement, Walker adopted a state of knowledge and conduct
inquiry. Reckless disregard could be found if the evidence demonstrated
"indifference to the consequences,"' 19 5 when a justified basis for believing the
article true did not exist.'96 The test is patently objective and the premium
on ignorance is removed.
Approval of such a change in the law should not have to be inferred
from denials of certiorari. The requirement of proving reckless disregard
through efforts aimed at showing an elusive mental state should be abol-
ished.197 An objective test based upon state of knowledge should be substi-
191. Id
192. See Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
193. 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
194. 188 Colo. at 98, 538 P.2d at 457.
195. Id
196. The Colorado Supreme Court based its adoption of this objective standard upon the
United States Supreme Court's approval of the "indifference to consequences" jury charge in
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing, 419 U.S. 245 (1974). 188 Colo. at 99, 538 P.2d at 457. While
Walker was a post-Gertz private-individual action, the fault standard applied was recklessness as
defined by Colorado tort law. Id See also Dixson v. Newsweek, 562 F.2d 626, 629 (10th Cir.
1977), and its conclusion that Cantrell was cited in Walker, "to support the conclusion that a less
demanding standard than that required by St. Amant was constitutionally permissible." Dixson
defines reckless disregard under Colorado law as being, "an act destitute of heed or concern for
consequences, especially foolishly heedless of danger; headlong, rash, without thought or care of
consequences." Id at 629. See also Anderson and Pagliuca, The Colorado Supreme Court's Develop-
ing Defamation Guidelines.- Colorado Enters the Quagmire, 59 DEN. L.J. 627, 630-32 (1982).
Walker was later cited as controlling in a public figure objective determination decision,
Kuhn v. Tribune Republican Publishing Co., 637 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1981). The Colorado
Supreme Court has since limited Walker's recklessness objective test to cases involving private
individual plaintiffs where, "matters of public or general concern" are not involved. Ste Diversi-
fied Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103, 1109-10 (1982). The Walker deci-
sion had accepted the Gertz invitation to the states to define a fault standard by adopting the
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), plurality opinion as to applying the ac-
tual malice standard to matters of public interest, although that. choice, as a constitutional
criteria, was rejected by the Court in Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. This line of Colorado cases well
illustrates the "quagmire" of attempting to decide upon motivation by circumstantial evidence
of a mental state at a particular point in time.
197. An objective determination of an unreasonable or imprudent risk assumption, reaching
the level of reckless disregard, would encompass those situations where one was not aware of
falsity by more than fifty percent.
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tuted as the benchmark. Juries, and not courts, would then again be
permitted to decide material issues of fact in the area of defamation.
The roadbed for such change has already been marked. The obscenity
cases' 98 demonstrated similar "intractible problems" 199 arising out of at-
tempts at defining standards of culpability on an ad hoc basis. Ultimately, it
was determined that what is or is not obscene is to be decided by a jury
based on an average person criterion, where the "rule of reason" is ap-
plied.2° ° Such a rule already applies to juries deciding compensatory defa-
mation claims by private individuals.20 1 There is no valid reason why the
reasonably prudent man should not be recognized as the determinant of the
conduct of those who falsely defame others through reckless disregard of
whether a defamatory falsehood is true or not.
198. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) and Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dal-
las, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
199. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
200. Id
201. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 329 (1974).
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